Manipulating word awareness dissociates feed-forward from feedback models of language-perception interactions by Francken, J. et al.
Manipulating word awareness dissociates
feed-forward from feedback models of
language-perception interactions
Jolien C. Francken1,*, Erik L. Meijs1, Odile M. Ridderinkhof2, Peter Hagoort1,3,
Floris P. de Lange1,† and Simon van Gaal1,2,†
1Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Nijmegen, PO Box 9101, 6500 HB
Nijmegen, Netherlands; 2Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Weesperplein 4, 1018 XA
Amsterdam, Netherlands; 3Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Wundtlaan 1, 6525 XD Nijmegen,
Netherlands
*Correspondence address: Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University, PO Box 9101, 6500 HB Nijmegen, Netherlands. Tel: þ31
24 36 68488; Fax: þ31 24 36 10652; E-mail: j.francken@donders.ru.nl
†Floris de Lange, http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6730-1452; Simon van Gaal, http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6628-4534
Abstract
Previous studies suggest that linguistic material can modulate visual perception, but it is unclear at which level of
processing these interactions occur. Here we aim to dissociate between two competing models of language–perception
interactions: a feed-forward and a feedback model. We capitalized on the fact that the models make different predictions
on the role of feedback. We presented unmasked (aware) or masked (unaware) words implying motion (e.g. “rise,” “fall”),
directly preceding an upward or downward visual motion stimulus. Crucially, masking leaves intact feed-forward
information processing from low- to high-level regions, whereas it abolishes subsequent feedback. Under this condition,
participants remained faster and more accurate when the direction implied by the motion word was congruent with the
direction of the visual motion stimulus. This suggests that language–perception interactions are driven by the feed-forward
convergence of linguistic and perceptual information at higher-level conceptual and decision stages.
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Introduction
A growing body of evidence shows that language affects percep-
tion (e.g. Meteyard et al., 2007; Winawer et al., 2007; Thierry et al.,
2009; Landau et al., 2010; Lupyan, 2012). However, it is unclear
whether linguistic material changes information processing at
low-level sensory stages (perceptual level) or whether these
“language-perception interactions” are mediated by effects at
higher cognitive levels of representation (conceptual level) or
even at later perceptual decision stages. Here, we refer to per-
ception as encompassing both the raw sensory processing of a
visual stimulus as well as the transformation of this event into
a categorical decision. In this study, we aim to dissociate be-
tween two models that favor low-level versus higher-level in-
teractions, respectively. In the first model, which we call the
“feedback model” (Fig. 1A), linguistic information is processed
in language-specific regions and then feeds back, or is “broad-
casted” to lower-level sensory regions to modulate perceptual
information processing. For instance, the activation of the se-
mantic representation of the motion-implying word “rise” in
the temporal cortex may feedback and affect the sensory
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representation or processing of visual motion stimuli (i.e. mov-
ing dots) in hMTþ/V5. This feedback model is one of the domi-
nant views in the field (Meteyard et al., 2007; Lupyan, 2012). In
line with this model, and the view that language comprehen-
sion reflects an “embodied process” (Barsalou, 2008), words or
sentences describing motion have been shown to activate mo-
tion-sensitive visual areas that process actual visual motion
(Saygin et al., 2010). Similarly, predictive processing theories
have proposed that motion words may induce an “automatic
top-down prediction” about visual motion, thereby automati-
cally recruiting hMTþ/V5, in a way that is similar to how expec-
tation affects visual perception (Hirschfeld and Zwitserlood,
2011; Lupyan, 2012; Summerfield and de Lange, 2014). However,
these theories are yet to be experimentally verified.
Alternatively, according to the second model language might
influence perception at a later conceptual or decision stage
rather than at the sensory stage, which is illustrated by the
“feed-forward model.” To illustrate, in this model the motion
word “rise” is processed in language-specific regions as well,
where it activates its conceptual representation. The visual mo-
tion information is first processed in motion-sensitive area
hMTþ/V5 and subsequently up to a more conceptual level
(“up"/"down”). Then, this conceptual representation of the vi-
sual stimulus interacts with the conceptual representation of
the motion word. In this model, language modulates perception
not by directly affecting the sensory processing stage in a top-
down manner, but because visual information converges on the
same conceptual representation as semantic information. This
view is supported by recent neuroimaging evidence (Tan et al.,
2008; Klemfuss et al., 2012; Francken et al., 2015): e.g. we have re-
cently shown that the congruency of word-visual motion pairs
(e.g. the word “rise” and upward visual motion) is reflected only
in higher-order areas [left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG)], with
activity in sensory visual areas (hMTþ/V5) unchanged
(Francken et al., 2015).
In sum, there is empirical support for both the feedback
and the feed-forward model of language–perception interac-
tions. Here we present an experimental procedure that allowed
us to directly compare key predictions of the two models.
Crucially, we manipulated the awareness level and thereby the
nature of processing of the linguistic information by means of
backward masking. Backward masking is a well-known experi-
mental procedure to render briefly presented stimuli unaware
by interspersing it with visual masks. Influential models of
awareness in monkey electrophysiology (Lamme et al., 2002)
and human imaging studies (Del Cul et al., 2007; Fahrenfort
et al., 2007) suggest that backward masking selectively disrupts
feedback processing, while leaving feed-forward processing
relatively intact (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; van Gaal and
Lamme, 2012). Because backward masking selectively disrupts
feedback processing, this experimental design allowed us to
adjudicate between the feed-forward and feedback model of
language–perception interactions. Here, masking disrupts the
feedback, sometimes also referred to as “broadcasting”
(Dehaene and Changeux, 2011), of the linguistic information
from language areas in the left temporal lobe to sensory areas
involved in word processing as well as sensory areas related
to processing of the visual motion stimulus. Since we explore
the effects of language on motion perception, we here refer to
the latter type of feedback. Thus, the feedback model predicts
that masking words will abolish the perceptual effect. In con-
trast, the feed-forward model predicts that masked words will
still affect perception because these effects are supported by
feed-forward processing to higher-level conceptual regions
only.
Besides this main question, we had two additional ques-
tions. First, we were interested in the potential lateralization of
(unaware) language–perception interactions. Previous studies
have indicated that these interactions might be larger, or exclu-
sively present, for visual information processed in the lan-
guage-dominant left hemisphere (Gilbert et al., 2006; Francken
et al., 2015), although evidence is mixed (Witzel and
Gegenfurtner, 2011). Therefore, we explored potential differ-
ences in lateralization effects between unmasked and masked
words by presenting motion stimuli in the left and right
hemifield.
Second, we wondered whether and how decision and control

















Figure 1. Models and task design
(A) In the feedback model of language-perception interactions (left), linguistic information is processed in language-specific regions and subse-
quently feeds back to the sensory system to modulate perceptual processing. Therefore, the processing of visual stimuli is influenced at the
level of visual cortex. In the feed-forward model of language–perception interactions (right), linguistic information is likewise processed in lan-
guage-specific regions where it activates a conceptual representation. Crucially, in this case, the visual information is also processed up to a
conceptual level, and it is here at the conceptual level that linguistic information interacts with visual stimuli. (B) A congruent or incongruent
motion word (upward or downward, e.g. “rise” or “fall“) is displayed in advance of every motion discrimination trial. All words are preceded by
a forward mask; unaware words are additionally followed by two backward masks. The visual motion stimulus is presented either in the left
or right lower visual field and the dots move upward or downward.
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and linguistic information might differ between unmasked and
masked conditions. Since the motion words refer to upward
and downward motion directions, control processes might be-
come activated to suppress this information which might inter-
fere with the motion discrimination task. Previous studies of
response conflict (i.e. Stroop or flanker tasks) show that control
mechanisms become activated with increasing response time
(Ridderinkhof, 2002; Jiang et al., 2013). However, at present, it is
undecided whether these mechanisms are dependent on
awareness of the (in)congruency of the stimulus or whether
masked stimuli can evoke these conflict-control mechanisms
as well (Kunde et al., 2012).
Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty-eight healthy, right-handed participants with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision (2 males, 36 females; age range:
18–29 years) took part in the two sessions of this experiment.
All participants were native Dutch speakers and reported hav-
ing no reading problems. The study was approved by the re-
gional ethics committee and a written informed consent was
obtained from the participants according to the Declaration of
Helsinki. Compensation was 25 Euros, or course credit.
Stimuli
Stimuli were generated using the Psychophysics Toolbox
(Brainard, 1997) within MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA),
and displayed on an ASUS LCD computer monitor (refresh rate
60 Hz, 1920 x 1080 resolution, size 50.9 x 28.6 cm). Stimuli were
presented in white on a light-gray background. The visual
random-dot motion (RDM) stimuli consisted of white dots (den-
sity¼ 2.5 dots/deg2; speed¼ 6.0/s) plotted within a circular ap-
erture (radius 7.5). On every trial, the RDM stimulus was
presented on either the left or right side of the screen (8.5 hori-
zontal eccentricity from fixation to center of circular aperture)
for 200 ms. In the first frame of the RDM stimulus, a random
configuration of dots was presented within the annulus.
Subsequently, on every frame a certain percentage of the dots
was replotted consistently in one direction (upward or down-
ward) on the next frame (see “Procedure”). Dots moving outside
of the annulus and other remaining dots were replotted at a
random location within the annulus.
Five verbs describing each direction of motion (in Dutch,
here translated to English; upward: grow, ascend, rise, climb, go
up; downward: sink, descend, drop, dive, go down), and 10 nonmo-
tion verbs (bet, mourn, exchange, glow, film, rest, cost, sweat, wish,
relax) were used in the experiment. Motions words and neutral
words were matched for lexical frequency (taken from the
CELEX database) and word length (5–8 letters) (both P> 0.2).
Masks were randomly generated combinations of 10 consonant
strings. Both words and masks were presented at the center of
the screen, using capital letters in a mono-spaced font.
Procedure
Participants performed a motion discrimination task (upward
vs. downward motion) on a visual RDM stimulus (Fig. 1B). A cen-
tral fixation cross (width 0.4 degrees) was presented throughout
the trial, except when a word, mask or blank screen was pre-
sented. Each trial started with a centrally presented forward
mask (50 ms) followed by a word (33 ms), which could either be
a motion word or a nonmotion (neutral) word. Presentation of
the words was pseudorandom within each block of the experi-
ment. Awareness of the word was manipulated by presenting
either backward masks (2 x 33 ms; unaware condition) or a blank
screen (67 ms; aware condition) after word presentation. A short
interstimulus interval (ISI) of 17 ms was always present after ei-
ther of these screens. Next, a visual RDM stimulus was pre-
sented (200 ms) in either the left visual field (LVF) or in the right
visual field (RVF). Participants had to indicate as quickly and ac-
curately as possible whether the RDM contained upward or
downward motion, while maintaining fixation at the central
cross. The brief presentation time of the RDM stimulus served
to minimize the chance of eye movements to the stimulus, as
saccade latencies are in the order of 200 ms (Carpenter, 1988).
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accu-
rately as possible by pressing a keyboard button with either
the index or middle finger of the right hand (counterbalanced
across participants). The intertrial interval (ITI) was 1000–
1166 ms.
In 10% of the trials, the motion discrimination task was fol-
lowed by an additional task assessing the visibility of the words.
Here, participants indicated whether the word presented earlier
in the trial was a motion or a nonmotion word. These catch tri-
als were included for two reasons. First, they ensured attention
to the words, which enhances processing of the primes in both
unmasked and masked conditions (Naccache et al., 2002; Spruyt
et al., 2012). Second, catch trials were used to estimate word
awareness. Participants were instructed to always respond to
the catch question. They were explicitly told that there was a
50% chance of either motion or nonmotion words (10 differ-
ent words of each category) in the catch trials. Note that
nonmotion words were solely included to test for the visibility
of the words.
The experiment consisted of two 1-h sessions on separate
days within 1 week. In the first session, participants performed
a training phase to familiarize them with the task and assess
their individual motion coherence threshold at which they per-
formed the motion discrimination task at 75% correct.
Participants first practiced the motion discrimination task in
three blocks with fixed coherence levels (80%, 55% and 30% re-
spectively). The coherence level of the next training block was
adjusted on the basis of performance in the previous blocks.
The coherence level after the fourth training block was taken as
the starting point for the Bayesian adaptive staircase procedure
(Watson and Pelli, 1983), which was run separately for LVF and
RVF stimuli. This was done to yield comparable task difficulty
and performance in both visual fields and for all participants.
The threshold for discrimination was defined as the percentage
of coherent motion for which the staircase procedure predicted
75% accuracy. In both the remaining training blocks and the ex-
periment, the coherence level was fixed within a block. The
same Bayesian staircase procedure ran throughout the block;
however, the actual coherence level was updated only between
blocks (based on the estimate after the last trial of a block) to ac-
commodate potential practice and fatigue effects over the
course of the experiment. In the final training blocks, partici-
pants practiced the discrimination task while the words were
presented and the catch task was added. During training, we
provided participants with trial-by-trial feedback for both the
motion task (except for the threshold estimation block) and
the catch trial task by means of a green or red fixation cross for
correct and incorrect responses, respectively. The training was
followed by a practice phase, in which participants completed
440 trials (5 blocks of 88 trials) of the actual experimental task to
familiarize them with the task and to avoid practice effects in
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the actual experimental blocks. On the second day, participants
first completed a short training (88 trials). The experiment on
the second day consisted of 10 blocks of 80 trials (800 trials in to-
tal). All analyses reported here are based on the 10 experimental
blocks in this final session. Summary feedback (percentage cor-
rect) was provided during the break after each block.
One participant was excluded because performance on the
unmasked trials of the motion discrimination task was <60%
correct. Therefore, analyses were performed on 37 participants.
Statistical analysis
We calculated congruency effects for reaction times (RT) on cor-
rect trials and error rates (ER). On congruent trials, the motion
described by the word matched the direction of visual motion,
e.g. “rise” followed by a stimulus with upward moving dots. On
incongruent trials, the motion described by the word and the di-
rection of visual motion did not match. Missed trials and trials
with RTs that were >3 SD than the individual subject mean RT
were excluded from the analyses (in total 2.3%). Each of the two
behavioral measures was subjected to a repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA), including factors “Congruency”
(congruent, incongruent), “Awareness” (aware, unaware) and
“Visual Field” (LVF, RVF).
To further assess the potentially different effects of un-
masked and masked words on motion perception, we used
Bayesian Statistics (Jeffreys, 1961; Rouder et al., 2009) and delta
plots (Ridderinkhof, 2002). Previous studies have indicated that
language–perception interactions might be larger, or exclu-
sively present, for visual information processed in the lan-
guage-dominant left hemisphere (Gilbert et al., 2006; Francken
et al., 2015), while others have failed to replicate these effects
(Witzel and Gegenfurtner, 2011). To differentiate between the
presence and absence of evidence for the null hypothesis
(no lateralization of congruency effects), we calculated Bayes
Factors (BFs). BFs express evidence ratios between hypotheses,
and therefore provide direct information about the relative
likelihood of the alternative vs. the null hypothesis. A BF of 1
indicates no preference for either the null or the alternative hy-
pothesis, and in large samples BFs will converge to either 0 or
infinity when the null or alternative hypothesis is true respec-
tively (Rouder et al., 2009). By convention, a BF likelihood ratio of
>3/1 provides moderate evidence for the alternative hypothe-
sis, >10/1 provides strong evidence for the alternative hypothe-
sis and >30/1 provides very strong evidence for the alternative
hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). Equivalently, a BF of <1/3 provides
moderate support for the null hypothesis, <1/10 provides
strong support for the null hypothesis and <1/30 provides very
strong support for the null hypothesis. BF ratios between 1/3
and 3/1 provide no evidence for either the null or alternative
hypothesis.
Second, we wondered whether decision and control pro-
cesses might become activated with increasing response time
to suppress the interference of the task-irrelevant linguistic in-
formation with the motion discrimination task. Therefore, we
calculated delta plots (reflecting the RT congruency effects for
different RT bins) and conditional accuracy functions (reflecting
the ER congruency effects for different RT bins) to assess the
congruency effects across the response time distribution. For
each visibility condition, every participant’s trials (correct trials
only) were sorted on RT and subsequently equally divided over
10 RT bins (separate bins for congruent and incongruent trials).
Next we performed a repeated measures ANOVA including fac-
tors “Congruency” (congruent, incongruent), “Awareness”
(aware, unaware) and “RT bin” (1 to 10). Previous studies show
that the build-up of suppression of interference is maximal at
the slowest RT bins (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Forstmann et al., 2008;
Jiang et al., 2013). Therefore, we performed additional planned
paired t-tests on RTs between the first (second minus first RT
bin) and last (tenth minus ninth RT bin) slopes to assess
whether conflict control became stronger over response time in
the current study as well. The strength of automatic response
activation by the motion words is inferred from the pattern of
errors present at the fastest RT bins. Stronger response capture
is associated with a higher percentage of fast errors
(Ridderinkhof, 2002). Thus, the critical measure for conflict con-
trol effects on ERs was the presence of a three-way interaction
between congruency, awareness and RT bin.
To assess the awareness of the words, we calculated the ac-
curacy and d’ in the catch trials. Percentage correct was defined
as the percentage of trials on which participants correctly indi-
cated whether the word was a motion word or not. d’ is an unbi-
ased measure of the discriminability sensitivity of the observer
(Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). d’ for the unmasked and
masked conditions were first compared to each other using
paired t-tests and subsequently compared with zero using one-
sample t-tests. Following this, we used the accuracy in binomial
tests to determine for every participant whether the perfor-
mance was above chance (50% correct). In addition, we calcu-
lated correlations between d’ and congruency effects. We used a
regression approach, referred to as Greenwald’s method
(Greenwald et al., 1995) to test whether the reported congruency
effects were still significant when discrimination performance
was extrapolated to zero visibility (d’¼ 0) [see Greenwald et al.
(1995) and Hannula et al. (2005) for further discussion and justifi-
cation of this method]. Finally, we split the participants into a
low visibility (d’<median) and a high visibility (d’>median)
group and we performed an ANOVA across the masked condi-
tions with the factors Congruency (2) and Group (2) to test for
potential differences between the congruency effects (CE) of the
low and high visibility groups.
Results
Word discriminability
We excluded 4 of 37 participants whose discrimination perfor-
mance of the masked words was above chance level (binominal
test, P< 0.1), because for these four participants we could not be
sure that they were unable to discriminate the masked words.
On a group level (for the remaining 33 participants), the discrim-
inability of the words (motion vs. no motion) was markedly
lower when the words were masked (unaware condition) than
when they were not masked (aware condition) [difference
t(32)¼ 10.22, P< 0.001; unaware d’¼ 0.16, corresponding to 52.8%
correct responses, t(32)¼ 2.57, P¼ 0.015; aware d’¼ 2.25, 84.0%
correct, t(32)¼ 11.11, P< 0.001]. To assess whether residual visi-
bility of the masked motion words is responsible for any of the
effects on visual motion perception, we performed several con-
trol analyses (see below).
Domasked motion words affect visual motion
perception?
We first focus on the effects of word awareness on word-motion
congruency. Participants responded faster to the motion stimuli
when they were preceded by a congruent motion word than by
an incongruent motion word (main effect of congruency:
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F1,32¼ 80.11, P< 0.001). This congruency effect was modulated
by word awareness (congruency x awareness: F1,32¼ 46.20,
p< 0.001), indicating that the difference between congruent and
incongruent conditions was larger when the words were un-
masked than when they were masked. Crucially, however, the
congruency effect was present both when the words were un-
masked (congruent: RT¼ 335 ms; incongruent: RT¼ 395 ms;
DRT¼ 60 ms, F1,32¼ 69.60, P< 0.001; Fig. 2A), and when they were
masked (congruent: RT¼ 350 ms; incongruent: RT¼ 356 ms;
DRT¼ 6 ms, F1,32¼ 6.77, P¼ 0.014).
The congruency effects in error rates go in the same direction
for both unmasked and masked words. On average, participants
answered 81.3% of trials correctly (66.7%, mean6SD) at an aver-
age motion coherence level of 48.1% for the LVF (618.3%,
mean6SD) and 46.5% for the RVF (616.3%, mean6SD).
Participants made fewer errors for congruent compared to incon-
gruent trials (main effect of congruency: F1,32¼ 130.19, P< 0.001;
aware: congruent: 11.3%; incongruent: 26.9%; DER¼ 15.6%,
F1,32¼ 126.34, P< 0.001; unaware: congruent: 17.8%; incongruent:
19.9%; DER¼ 2.1%, F1,32¼ 10.89, P¼ 0.002; Fig. 2B). Again, the con-
gruency effect was larger for unmasked words than for masked
words (congruency x awareness F1,32¼ 81.30, P< 0.001).
The word discrimination trials, interspersed throughout the
experiment, revealed that performance (visibility) was low for
masked words (52.8% correct responses). However, on a group
level, visibility was higher than chance level. Therefore, to
check whether incidental word visibility might have been
responsible for the observed congruency effects, we performed
several control analyses. First, if incidental word visibility were
responsible for the observed congruency effects, one would ex-
pect reliable positive correlations between discrimination
scores (d’) and congruency effects. However, this was not the
case for RTs (rs¼ 0.17, P¼ 0.34) and ERs (rs¼ 0.19, P¼ 0.28).
Further, we used a regression approach, referred to as
Greenwald’s method (Greenwald et al., 1995) to test whether the
reported congruency effects were still significant when discrim-
ination performance was extrapolated to zero visibility (d’¼ 0).
Indeed, the linear regression analyses revealed a significant in-
tercept for ERs (intercept¼ 1.73, P¼ 0.018) and a trend for RTs
(intercept¼ 5.42, P¼ 0.069) which, although not conclusive, fur-
ther suggests that congruency effects were induced by masked
words that could not be perceived consciously. Next, we split
the participants (n¼ 33) into a low visibility (d’<median, n¼ 16)
and a high visibility (d’>median, n¼ 17) group. An ANOVA
across the masked conditions indicated that there were no
significant differences between the congruency effects (CE) be-
tween the low and high visibility groups (ERs: low visibility
group CE¼ 1.7%; high visibility group CE¼ 2.4%; F1,31¼ 0.29,
P¼ 0.59; BF: 1/3.5; RTs: low visibility group CE¼ 3 ms; high visi-
bility group CE¼ 10 ms; F1,31¼ 1.52, P¼ 0.23; BF: 1/2.1). Below, we
will describe qualitative differences between the masked and
unmasked condition that further suggest that subjects were un-
able to perceive the masked words (Jacoby, 1991; Merikle et al.,
2001).
In summary, both RTs and ERs showed that masked words
influenced motion perception, although to a lesser extent than
words that were not masked. These results are in line with
feed-forward models explaining the effects of language on per-
ception, but not with feedback models.
Spatial characteristics of language–perception
interactions
We reasoned that masked and unmasked words might influ-
ence perception in qualitatively different ways, due to the
different neural processes involved in both situations (feed-
forward vs. recurrent/feedback processing, respectively). First,
we tested whether the congruency effect for masked and un-
masked conditions was differentially modulated by the visual
field in which the visual motion stimuli were presented. For
both RTs and ERs, there was no interaction between congru-
ency, awareness and visual field (both Ps> 0.7; RTs: aware: DRT
LVF: 56 ms, DRT RVF: 62 ms; unaware: DRT LVF: 5 ms, DRT
RVF: 8 ms; ERs: aware: DER LVF: 15.5%, DER RVF: 15.7%; unaware:
DER LVF: 2.1%, DER RVF: 2.1%). Frequentist statistics provide a
measure of confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis, but not
a measure of confidence in the null hypothesis itself. In order to
verify the true absence of lateralized effects, we calculated BFs
separately for both masking conditions. We observed moderate
evidence (BF< 1/3) for the null hypothesis, indicating no effects
of visual field on congruency for both masked and unmasked
conditions, both in terms of RTs and ERs (aware: RTs: BF¼ 1/4.5;
ERs: BF¼ 1/7.2; unaware: RTs: BF¼ 1/6.2; ERs: BF¼ 1/7.4).
Temporal characteristics of language–perception
interactions
Our previous analyses suggest that language influences percep-
tion at higher-level conceptual or decision stages (in a feed-
forward manner) rather than at low-level sensory stages (in a
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Figure 2. Results
(A) Mean reaction times (in ms) in the unmasked (aware, left bars)
and masked (unaware, right bars) conditions for visual motion stim-
uli that were preceded by a congruent (green) motion word were
faster than when preceded by an incongruent (red) motion word. (B)
Mean error rates (%) in the aware condition and unaware condition
were lower for congruent than incongruent motion words. (C) The
delta plot for reaction times (in ms) congruency effects (incongru-
ent-congruent, CE) in the conscious (gray) condition showed the typ-
ical RT conflict-control profile with an initial CE increase over RT
bins and a CE decrease in the last bin. In the unaware condition (or-
ange), the CE was not affected by response time and did not decrease
in the last bin. (D) Conditional accuracy functions for error rates (%)
CE. Stronger response capture is associated with a higher percentage
of fast errors. This pattern of decreasing CE across RT bins is present
for the aware condition, but not for the unaware condition. Error
bars denote SEM. *P< 0.05, **P< 0.01, ***P< 0.001.
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explored the possible differences in decision and control pro-
cesses that evolve after the actual integration of perceptual and
linguistic information for masked and unmasked conditions. To
do so, we calculated the so-called “delta plots,” reflecting the RT
congruency effects for different RT bins and “conditional accu-
racy functions,” reflecting the ER congruency effects for differ-
ent RT bins, to assess the congruency effects across the
response time distribution (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Forstmann et al.,
2008; Jiang et al., 2013). The delta plots for the unmasked condi-
tion showed the typical RT conflict-control profile
(Ridderinkhof, 2002; Forstmann et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2013).
The congruency effects first increased over response time (con-
gruency x RT bin: F1,32¼ 24.47, P< 0.001) and later decreased in
the last bin (2nd–1st vs. 10th–9th bin: T32¼ 2.35, P¼ 0.025;
Fig. 2C). There was a significant difference between the congru-
ency effects for masked and unmasked conditions over re-
sponse time (congruency x awareness x RT bin: F1,32¼ 13.08,
P< 0.001) driven by the overall increase in the congruency effect
for unmasked but not for masked words. Interestingly, for
masked words, the congruency effect was not affected by re-
sponse time (congruency x RT bin: F1,32¼ 1.39, P¼ 0.19) and the
RT delta plot did not show the typical control-related decrease
in the congruency effect for the last RT bin (2nd–1st vs. 10th–9th
bin: T32¼0.06, P¼ 0.955; difference between aware and un-
aware conditions: T32¼ 1.47, P¼ 0.15). Thus, for the unmasked
condition, we found a quick increase in the RT congruency ef-
fect with response time, followed by a later decrease, probably
as a consequence of the activation of interference control mech-
anisms. In the masked condition, however, RT congruency ef-
fects were stable over RT bins and did not show any of the
control-dynamics as observed in the unmasked condition. The
strength of automatic response activation by the motion words
is inferred from the pattern of errors present at the shortest RT
bins. Stronger response capture is associated with a higher per-
centage of fast errors (Ridderinkhof, 2002). Again, for accuracy
there was a significant three-way interaction (congruency x
awareness x RT bin: F1,32¼ 3.54, P< 0.001), indicating differential
effects of response time on congruency for the unmasked and
masked conditions. For the unmasked condition, the congru-
ency effect decreased over response time (congruency x RT bin:
F1,32¼ 7.59, P< 0.001), thus showing the typical pattern of these
conditional accuracy functions. In contrast, the masked condi-
tion showed no modulation over RT bins (congruency x RT bin:
F1,32¼ 1.35, P¼ 0.22; Fig. 2D). Thus, only for the unmasked words
a large ER congruency effect was present for the fast RT bins,
which is in line with the fact that voluntary control mecha-
nisms take time to be initiated. In the masked condition, how-
ever, the data pattern was very different and again, like for RT,
did not show any of these control-dynamics. Note that this last
set of analyses also further suggests that the masked words
were invisible. We observed qualitative differences in the ef-
fects of masked vs. unmasked motion words on voluntary con-
trol mechanisms, but similar effects on congruency effects
(reflecting language–perception interactions). These qualitative
differences are generally considered as convincing evidence for
unconscious perception (Jacoby, 1991; Merikle et al., 2001).
In sum, when the word and the motion stimulus were
congruent, both unmasked and masked words sped up motion
discrimination and increased discrimination performance com-
pared to incongruent word–motion pairs. Language–perception
interactions were equally present for visual stimuli presented in
the left and right hemifield, but only in the unmasked condition
were voluntary control mechanisms activated across response
time to reduce linguistic interference.
Discussion
We investigated whether language affects perception in a feed-
forward or a feedback manner by disrupting the processing of
motion words by means of backward masking. The rationale be-
hind this experimental design is that feedback processing is dis-
rupted by masking, as revealed by empirical evidence from
monkey electrophysiology and human neuroimaging studies
(Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme et al., 2002; Del Cul et al.,
2007; Fahrenfort et al., 2007). Hence, the feedback model predicts
that interactions between language and perception will be abol-
ished under masked conditions. Since backward masking does
not affect feed-forward processing, the feed-forward model pre-
dicts that effects of language on perception will still be present
when the words are masked. Our results support the feed-for-
ward model: when motion words were masked, motion words
that were congruent with the direction of the visual motion
stimulus resulted in faster and more accurate visual motion di-
rection discrimination relative to incongruent conditions. Thus,
our results suggest that language changes perception at a
higher, conceptual level, rather than at the lower, sensory level.
With several control analyses, we verified that our results are
unlikely driven by residual visibility of the masked motion
words.
A number of previous studies are in line with this interpreta-
tion. We recently found that congruent word–motion pairs elicit
higher BOLD activity than incongruent combinations in the left
middle temporal gyrus (Francken et al., 2015), an area involved
in both lexical retrieval and semantic integration (Hagoort et al.,
2009; Menenti et al., 2011). Crucially, there were no effects in mo-
tion-sensitive visual areas such as hMTþ/V5. Interestingly, sup-
port for this effect was also found by an fMRI study in which
linguistic material was only implicitly included. Tan et al. (2008)
had participants judge whether two colored squares had the
same or a different color. Even though the linguistic color vo-
cabulary was irrelevant for the perceptual discrimination task,
left temporo-parietal circuits associated with word-finding pro-
cesses were activated more strongly when subjects had to
discriminate between hard-to-name colors compared to easy-
to-name colors. These studies indicate that the interaction be-
tween language and perception is mediated by “language areas”
that integrate linguistic and visual information. These data
stand in sharp contrast to previous proposals that linguistic ma-
terial describing motion elicits a “perceptual simulation” in low-
level visual areas similar to actually seeing motion (Saygin et al.,
2010).
How does language change perceptual decision making ac-
cording to the feed-forward model? We reason that visual mo-
tion stimuli might be conceptually categorized as reflecting
evidence for “upward” and “downward” motion directions,
since participants are required to make a categorical perceptual
decision. This may cause conceptual representations to be auto-
matically activated (Tan et al., 2008; Thierry et al., 2009), even
though they are not required for task performance. If the con-
ceptual representation activated by the visual motion stimulus
matches the conceptual representation that is activated by the
motion word, this then results in more activity in lMTG
(Francken et al., 2015), as well as improved behavioral perfor-
mance. It is also possible that language–perception interactions
take place at an even later decision stage. Taken together, the
reason why masked (unaware) words are still able to change
perception according to the feed-forward model is that the in-
teraction does not depend on feedback of linguistic information
to sensory areas. The only requirement is that the masked
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words are semantically processed, which does indeed occur de-
spite backward masking (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; van Gaal
and Lamme, 2012). Although we show that feed-forward pro-
cessing is sufficient for language–perception interactions to oc-
cur, our data cannot adjudicate whether larger congruency
effects under unmasked conditions are due to additional feed-
back processing or increased stimulus strength.
Proponents of the feedback model argue that language–
perception interactions might be dependent on visual “mental
imagery,” which is the conscious, internal generation of images
(Kosslyn et al., 2001). This process would require feedback from
regions up in the cortical hierarchy together with language
areas in order to affect low-level sensory processing. For exam-
ple, when reading stories describing motion events, participants
showed a motion aftereffect illusion, which can be interpreted
as evidence for direction-selective motion adaptation in the vi-
sual system (Dils and Boroditsky, 2010). Interestingly, individ-
uals differed in how early in the story the effect appeared, and
this difference was predicted by the strength of an individual’s
motion aftereffect following explicit motion imagery. Thus,
when imagery is sufficiently vivid, language appears to induce
changes in the visual system. However, by showing that
masked words can still influence perception, we demonstrate
here that mental imagery cannot account for all instances of
linguistic modulations of perception.
We further qualified the spatial and temporal characteristics
of the language–perception interactions. First of all, we did not
observe any lateralization of the reported effects. Interestingly,
in our previous study in which words were unattended, but not
masked, the RT effect (but not the accuracy effect) was lateral-
ized to the right visual field (Francken et al., 2015). Therefore,
our findings provide an alternative explanation for the often re-
ported (and debated) observation that language exerts stronger
effects for stimuli presented in the right visual field (Gilbert
et al., 2006; Regier and Kay, 2009; Witzel and Gegenfurtner,
2011). This lateralization is explained by the fact that informa-
tion from the right visual field would have preferential access to
the left-lateralized language system (Gilbert et al., 2006; Regier
and Kay, 2009; Klemfuss et al., 2012). Although this is an intui-
tively appealing idea, our data suggest that this depends on
the degree to which the linguistic information is attended: unat-
tended stimuli might show lateralized effects, whereas at-
tended stimuli might not. Future studies are clearly needed to
further explore this hypothesis in more detail.
Finally, we observed that decision and control processes that
evolve after the integration of perceptual and linguistic infor-
mation differed between unmasked and masked conditions. In
line with previous studies of response conflict (Ridderinkhof,
2002), we reasoned that to suppress the interference of the task-
irrelevant words, inhibitory control mechanisms might be acti-
vated with increasing response times. Interestingly, these con-
trol dynamics were uniquely observed for unmasked words.
Thus, although masked words have the power to change per-
ceptual decisions about motion direction, late voluntary control
mechanisms to suppress the irrelevant linguistic information
were not activated (Tsushima et al., 2006). First, this finding pro-
vides evidence for the notion that there was a clear qualitative
difference in awareness between the masked and unmasked
conditions. Second, these results inform recent discussions
about the role of consciousness in cognitive control and the po-
tential control processes that can unconscious stimuli might be
able to affect or even initiate (Kunde et al., 2012; van Gaal et al.,
2012; Ansorge et al., 2014). Previously, it has been shown that
masked stimuli that “explicitly” signal the need for control (e.g.
an unconscious stop-signal or an unconscious task-switching
cue) can elicit behavioral and neural indices of control behavior
(Lau and Passingham, 2007; van Gaal et al., 2008, 2009, 2010).
However, it has recently been argued that “implicit” cues, such
as specific task properties that have to be derived from repeated
exposure to the trials, might not (Kunde et al., 2012). Because in
the present experiment masked words were not explicitly asso-
ciated with control processes, and are in fact irrelevant to per-
form the motion discrimination task, this might be a situation
in which control processes are dependent on awareness.
However, some previous studies using nonverbal material (i.e.
arrow stimuli) in typical priming tasks have observed control
mechanisms irrespective of conflict awareness (van Gaal et al.,
2010; Francken et al., 2011; Desender et al., 2013), although evi-
dence is mixed (Kunde, 2003; Ansorge et al., 2011) (for reviews
see Ansorge et al., 2014; Kunde et al., 2012). It might be that with
the current set-up initial conflict was too small to initiate fur-
ther control operations in the masked condition (Kunde et al.,
2012). Future studies should be performed to further explore in
which situations control operations can be triggered implicitly
(and explicitly) and in which situations it cannot, and what fac-
tors underlie these differences.
In conclusion, here we have manipulated word awareness
in a visual motion discrimination task to explore at what
level of processing the influence of language on perception
takes place. Specifically, we were able to dissociate feed-
forward models from feedback models of language–perception
interactions. We observed a clear influence of language on
motion discrimination for both masked (unaware) and
unmasked (aware) words. Because feed-forward processing
remains intact whereas feedback to low-level sensory areas is
disrupted by masking, these results can only be explained by a
feed-forward model. Therefore, these findings provide evidence
for the hypothesis that language–perception interactions occur
at stages beyond low-level sensory regions and are mainly
driven by interactions at higher-level conceptual and decision
stages.
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